' conditioned reflexes ' of Pavlov and his school, to which he attributes ' supreme philosophical importance'; because it has, he says, abolished the difference between the reflex and the volitional action. Further: * Mental inheritance is a meaningless collocation of words, unless it is possible to bring the concept of mentality within the mechanistic framework. That is what the behaviouristic school in psychology has undertaken to do. The future of social biology depends on the success which attends this effort.' A dark prospect indeed!

The behaviouristic school has had a meteoric success in American colleges; but it is now waning very distinctly even in that sphere, and survives as hardly more than a prejudice in some quarters against the use of what is opprobriously called * mentalistic language' in the discussion of psychological problems. * If/ writes Hogben, ' we can usefully treat the characteristics of conscious behaviour without invoking a holistic or animistic concept of consciousness, the scope of introspective philosophy must in time dwindle to a vanishing point/ And, he adds: ' Pavlov's work has shown us that even when he is dealing with " conscious behaviour", the biologist can still approach the subject-matter of his inquiries with the same attitude which the physicist adopts/

In view of the * supreme importance * attributed by Hogben to Pavlov's ' conditioned reflexes ' as the main support of mechanical biology, it might seem necessary to set forth a detailed and exhaustive

criticism and evaluation of that important work. But it may suffice merely to indicate to the reader how this matter stands. For I have dealt with it at some length elsewhere; and it is now generally recognized, and was admitted by Pavlov himself in his later publications, that his earlier